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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter identifies the results of Kant's philosophical system on the 
contemporary discussion concerning an inerrant revelation. Knowl-
edge, for Kant, is possible only as the forms and categories of the mind 
organize the raw data of the senses. Beyond this phenomenal world, the 
mind can only postulate what must or ought to be. It cannot know what 
is. The first postulate of this practical reasoning is freedom. The indi-
vidual is autonomous, knows the good, and is capable of willing and 
doing as he ought. 
Within such an epistemological framework, revelation becomes un-
necessary, useless, and unverifiable. Inerrancy is not only false but 
incomprehensible in such a system. Since Kant's theory of knowledge 
largely dominates contemporary theology, it is inevitable that in-
errancy cannot be seen as an option. 
3 W. David Beck 
AGNOSTICISM: KANT 
THERE IS FAIR agreement among historians of thought 
that Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) must be regarded not only as 
the great creative genius of the modern period but also as one of 
the most important framers of the contemporary mind. His 
significant contributions to epistemology have secured him wide 
fame, while his influence on the development of theology has 
been unparalleled. 
Part of Kant's greatness lies in the fact that he was able to 
synthesize the two dominant but conflicting modes of thought of 
the Enlightenment, empiricism and rationalism, into an inte-
grated whole. That, however, should not blind us to the origi-
nality of his thought, in which the other part of his greatness is to 
be found. This two-sidedness-a synthesizer, yet original-
forces us to study Kant against the background of his historical 
and cultural setting. He is as much a culmination of preceding 
thought as he is a foundation for what was to follow. 
Having said all of this, I must hasten to add that Kant's 
influence has not been regarded as salutary in all corners, espe-
cially among evangelical theologians. A few examples will 
suffice. John Gerstner states that it was Kant who began "the 
philosophic revolt against reason which for contemporary man 
has made any sort of rational apologetic impossible."l Clark 
Pinnock, in a similar vein, refers to Kant's "repudiation of ra-
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tional religion,"2 the result of which has been that "the objectiv-
ity and rationality of divine revelation have been philosophically 
questioned."3 Francis Schaeffer claims that "with his work, the 
hope ofa unified knowledge was on the threshold of splitting into 
two parts, neither having a relationship with the other."4 
Schaeffer is referring here to the isolation of metaphysics, and 
with it religion, from factual knowledge. This split, and the 
placing of religion in the realm of the postulated but not known, is 
for Schaeffer the source of contemporary "autonomous" mans 
who determines for himself the God in whom he will believe. 
As these quotes might indicate, most theologians have focused 
on Kant's epistemology. In this essay, therefore we will spend 
some time developing this foundation of his thought and will 
return to it in the closing critique. However, most of the essay 
focuses on Kant's views on revelational religion, as he presents 
them in Religion Within the Limits if Reason Alone (1793). 
This study is divided into four sections. The first is a brief 
history of Kant's life. Second, we look at the basic structure of 
Kant's system, in particular the possibility of knowledge. We 
turn then to the question of religious knowledge and the implica-
tions of his epistemology for revelation. The concluding section 
presents critical remarks and shows the importance of Kant's 
influence on contemporary theology. 
A BRIEF HISTORY 
Most of Kant's biographers have noted-sometimes to the 
point of exaggeration-that his life was singularly uneventful. 
Certainly in comparison to many other philosophers Kant had a 
rather ordinary life. On the other hand, the productivity of his 
last twenty years is extraordinary to say the least. But let us start 
at the beginning. 
Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in Konigsberg. His father 
was a saddler and quite poor; his grandfather was an emigrant 
from Scotland. Konigsberg, and with it Kant's family, had felt 
the influence of the Pietist movement. Without doubt, the Pietist 
renewal within the Lutheran church was a major influence in 
Kant's life, particularly in the person of Franz A. Schultz, the 
family's pastor. The young Kant attended the Pietist Collegium 
Fredericianum from 1732 to 1740. Schultz became the director 
there the year after Kant entered. 
Pietism had been founded by Philipp Jakob Spener (1635-
I 
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1705). His mantle fell on his student August Franke. The key to 
Pietism was its concentration on experience, including an insis-
tence on a clear, sometimes exaggerated, conversion experience. 
Pietism also emphasized the practical rather than dogmatic use 
of Scripture-that is, the purpose of Scripture is to nourish and 
sanctity. Many commentators have stressed the negative results 
of this view of Scripture-particularly on Kant-but that ought 
not to blind us to the positive aspects of this renewal movement. 
German historians trace the beginnings of social programs for 
the needy, including orphanages and missions, to Spener and 
Franke. There is no doubt that Pietism also brought about a 
concern for a disciplined and separated life on the part of the 
believer. 
At the Collegium Fredericianum this concern developed into a 
regimented, regulated routine that impressed Kant as being 
superficial and led to his total-and lifelong-rejection of reli-
gious practice in general. Though Kant retained a permanent 
respect for Pietism, he consistently refused to attend church or 
take part in any sort of church activity. 
At age sixteen Kant became a student in the faculty of theol-
ogy at the University of Konigsberg. Here he encountered the 
second major theological influence that molded his philosophy: 
Wolffian rationalism. Though Konigsberg had previously been 
staunchly Pietistic, it had, in the decade before Kant began his 
studies, come under the influence of English "free thinkers" and 
deists and especially that of Christian Wolfrs (1679-1754) 
theological development of Leibniz. 
Whereas Pietism stressed revelation and the experiential, 
Wolff looked to the rational and metaphysical. He held that 
reason is capable of developing the doctrines of Christianity 
without the assistance of, though perhaps at the instigation of, 
revelation. Wolff deduced, with geometric precision, a complete 
theology beginning from the ontological argument for God's 
existence.6 
Kant learned most of his philosophy during these years from 
Martin Knutzen, a Wolffian, though a favorite pupil of the 
Pietist Schultz. Knutzen introduced Kant to the broad scope of 
his knowledge from mathematics to astronomy, but particularly 
physics. Kant's earliest writings were in physics, including his 
dissertation in 1755, and he remained interested in the work of 
Newton throughout his life. 
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During the eight years between the completion of his studies at 
Konigsberg and the dissertation, Kant earned a meager living as 
a family tutor. For the fifteen years that followed, Kant was 
unsuccessful in securing a professorial appointment at the uni-
versity. He was forced to remain in relative poverty as a private 
lectur~r, despite the fact that he quickly gained a reputation as a 
brilliant teacher and attracted students from far beyond 
Konigsberg. 
In this period, from 1755 to 1770, Kant was strongly 
influenced by Roussea.u and Hume. The former gave Kant the 
importance of the concept of freedom; the latter awakened him 
from his "dogmatic slumbers" as Kant himself put it. The Kant 
who emerged from these years had shed his Wolffian rationalism 
and come to grips with empirical skepticism at the other ex-
treme. 
Having rejected appointments at two renowned universities, 
Kant was finally offered the chair of logic and metaphysics at 
Konigsberg in 1770, a position he held until poor health forced 
him to retire in 1797. He died in 1804. 
The years following 1770 were marked by unbelievable pro-
ductivity. During the first ten years he carefully worked out his 
system. In 1781 his chief work, The Critique of Pure Reason, 
appeared. Prolegomena to A'!)' Future Metaphysic was published in 
1783, followed by Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic if Morals 
in 1785 and Metaphysical First Principles if Natural Science the fol-
lowing year. In 1788 Kant published the second great critique, 
The Critique if Practical Reason, and in 1790 the third, The Critique 
if Judgment. The last of the great works of this period, and the 
main source for this discussion, is his Religion Within the Limits if 
Reason Alone, published in 1793. 
This last-named work, Religion Within the Limits if Reason Alone, 
precipitated the only real "event" of Kant's life. In 1786 Fred-
erick William II had ascended the Prussian throne. His officials 
imposed rather stringent censorship on religious publications. 
The first section of the Religion passed without much problem. 
The other sections were not approved at Konigsberg; Kant was 
forced to gain the imprimatur from the faculty at Jena. Out-
raged, the king demanded that Kant no longer publish on mat-
ters of religion, a demand to which Kant assented, though the 
Religion itself was frequently published and revised in following 
years. 
I 
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KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
~ant's epistemolog~ begins with the rejection of the two major 
Op~lOr:S. that faced hIm: Humean empiricism and Wolffian-
LeIbmzIan rationalism. Nevertheless, Kant does make use of 
manr: of the insi~hts of each. With Hume he agrees that knowl-
edge ~s of se~satlOns, but with Leibniz he recognizes that knowl-
edge IS possIble only when the mind determines the nature of its 
data. 
The problem in Hume is that limitation of the mind to the 
passive reception of impressions makes knowledge impossible. 
Kant .argued that if Hume were correct, there could never be 
anythI~!? beyond the irr:pressions. Knowledge presupposes the 
re~ogmtlOn and companson of causal, spatial, and temporal re-
latlons, and much more. None of this, however, is provided by 
the senses. ~hey give us only tastes, odors, color patches, and so 
on. If there IS knowledge, and Kant never doubted that there is 
then Hume must be wrong. ' 
We s~oul~ note h:r: Kant's method for philosophy. He does 
not begm .wIth defin~tIOns, as did Wolff, nor does he attempt a 
psychologIcal analYSIS of knowledge, as did Locke and Hume. 
Rather, Kant asks for the logical prerequisites of what we know 
to be the case. There ~s knowledge. How then is it possible? What 
must be the case for It to occur? This is the "critical" or "trans-
cer:dental" method, the first method designed specifically for 
phIlosophy. 
How .t~en is knowledge possible? Kant begins the introduction to 
The Crztzque if Pure Reason with the following statement: 
There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experi-
ence .... In the or~er of time, therefore, we have no knowledge 
ant7cedent to expenence, and with experience all our knowledge begms. 7 
Kant accepts, then, the vie:w of the empiricists regarding the 
senses: The senses are paSSIve receptors of isolated and atomic 
sensatIOns-sounds, c~lor patches, and so forth. They are also 
th~ only means by whIch any content can be provided for our 
mmds to process.8 
Kant is equally adan:ant, however, that sensation by itself 
cannot be knowledge. WIthout the operations of the mind there 
~an ~e no det~rmination of the data. The impressions do not 
IdentIfy, coordmate, or categorize themselves. We do not neces-
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sarily know what we are seeing when the mechanism of the 
retina registers light impulses. Knowledge begins with sensation 
but it does not end there. Kant himself puts it this way; 
"Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without con-
cepts are blind."9 
Just what is it that the mind adds to the sensations so that 
knowledge results? First, the sensations are always sensed, and 
can be sensed, only within the structures of time and space. If the 
impressions were not put in sequence, arranged in relationship 
to each other, and determined in size, extension, and so on, 
we could not know at all. Since time and space are not actual 
impressions yet are presupposed by the possibility of knowing, 
they must beforms of intuition for the mind. They are not part of 
the data, but are rather the ways in which our minds conceive 
the data. 
There is, further, a "transcendental logic," that is, the neces-
sary categories whereby the mind judges the nature of sensations 
in respect to their quantity, quality, relations (this includes, for 
example, causal dependence), and modality. Together, the forms 
and the categories are the filters that give order and determina-
tion to the data of the senses. 
Knowledge, then, is the mind's conceptualization of the data. 
When there is no sensory input, there can be no knowledge. As 
~e ~hall see, t~e initial conclusion of Kant's epistemology is 
sIgmficant for hIS treatment of revelation. 
. Kant is convinced, however, that there is another type of 
Judgment that we can make. The judgments that we make re-
garding the contingent data of the senses are, to use Kant's term 
a posteriori. But, Kant asks in the Critique, how and in which 
di~ciplines is it ~ossible to make judgments that are necessary and 
unzversal? S~ch Judgments would have to be a priori, that is, 
before and mdependent of the sensory data. The judgments that 
we make on the basis of the senses could never meet the criteria. 
They ca~not be univer~al since no one could ever observe every 
possIble Instance of a Judgment. The geometric judgment that 
the. shortest distance between two points is a straight line-
umversally-cannot be known from observation. Perhaps it will 
turn out differently the next time! Likewise, our observations 
cannot establish the necessity of any judgment. The senses, says 
Kant, can. only tell us what is, in fact, the case. They cannot 
support a Judgment about what necessarily is the case. 
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In fact, we have already come across the source of universal 
and necessary judgments. The forms of intuition (time and 
space). and the categories are concepts that govern every possible 
sensatIon and thus meet the criteria. Kant considers these to be 
the foundations of mathematics and the sciences. These disci-
plines are thus firmly based. Their principles are known as uni-
versal and necessary truths. 
Is there metaphysical knowledge? We can now ask if, and how it is 
possible for an individual to know anything about the ulti:nate 
nature of reality-the existence and nature of God the condition 
and destiny of man, the status and source of values' and so on. At 
this point it is important to restate the essential' conclusion of 
Kant's epistemology: While sensation provides the data of 
knowledge, i~ is the mind tha~ actually makes the knowing possi-
~le b~, formmg an? categonzing. Furthermo;e, it is only the 
pure understandIng of the concepts of the mInd that is univer-
sal and necessary. 
Kant argues that there can be no knowledge of metaphysics 
be.cause an atte~pt at such knowledge takes the concepts of the 
mInd beyond theIr proper use. In the section of the Critique titled 
"The Antinomies of Pure Reason," Kant claims to demonstrate 
that when reason is applied to the ultimate that is the absolute 
or infinite, a curious fact ensues: both sides ~fa con;radiction can 
be proved. The best known of Kant's four examples is the third 
antinomy. He states it this way: 
Theszs: Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only 
causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all 
be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume 
that there is also another causality, that of freedom. 
Antithesis: There is no freedom; everything in the world takes 
place solely in accordance with the laws of nature.10 
Kant takes the antinomies to be proof that our rational 
abilities are meant to function only in relation to the realm of 
sensible data. We cannot know reality in itself. We know only the 
appearanc~s,. not what is re~lly out there. We cannot get beyond 
our agnOStICIsm by extendIng the use of the categories to the 
metaphysical realm of freedom, God, and values; nor can we 
ever have direct acquaintance with the objects of our world. The 
possibilities of knowing are limited by the forms of intuition and 
the categories of judgment in their proper function. 
60 BIBLICAL ERRANCY 
Kant's discussion, however, does not end here. While it is true 
that we have exhausted the realm of pure reason and knowledge 
proper, Kant discovers a second use of reason. Reas.on in relation 
to experience can find only purely causal relatIOns between 
physical objects. Neverthele~s, reason kn~ws that there must be 
an initiation of causal chams by the wIll. Knowledge of the 
"phenomena," to use Kant's term for the appearances ~s 
ordered by the mind, could never include the freedom of the wIll 
as an agent of events. Yet the chain of natural ~aus.es cannot ~e 
thought of as going back infinitely. For no lmk m the cham 
provides a complete ("sufficient"ll) explanation. There must be 
b I b ·· ". "12 an a so ute egmnmg, a pnme mover. 
There can be only one solution to the third antinomy. Free-
dom is not part of the phenomenal world but of the unknowable 
"noumenal" world-the world as it really is, not as it appears to 
us to be. Freedom must be the case, but we do not know it. This 
precisely is the second use of reason, name~y, in r~lation to w~at 
ought to be, n?t what ~s. Kant refe:s t~, th.lS. fun~~IOn as tractzcal 
reason, the subject of hIS second major cntIque. P:actlcal rea-
son is to be identified as will in its intellectual functIOn of deter-
mining action. . 
Thus, in the Critique if Pure Reason Kant ha~ determmed the 
possibility of freedom and the noumenal. .But thIS, of course, do~s 
not give us actual evidence for the realIty of freedom. For thIS 
step there must be experience. 
In the case offreedom there can be no empirical evidence. The 
data of the senses give us no clue. We experience desires, emo-
tions, and feelings; but these could all exist wi.thout the freedom 
to fulfill them. Kant holds that there is expenence of the moral 
law. It is at this point that we turn to the Critique if Practical 
Reason. 
The moral law shows its reality, in a manner which is sufficient 
even from the point of view of the critzque of theoretical reason, in 
adding a positive characteristic to a causalit.y.,:hich so ~ar has 
been conceived only negatively and the posslbIlIty of whIch, al-
though incomprehensible to theoretical reason, had ye~ to be as-
sumed by it. This positive characteristic is the conceptIOn of.r~a­
son as immediately determining the will (through the condItIOn 
that a universal form can be given to its maxims as laws). Thus, 
for the first time, the moral law can give objective (though only 
practical) reality to reason which always hitherto had to tran-
r 
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scend all possible experience when it put its ideas to a theoretical 
use .... 13 
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For Kant this experience is unassailable. The conclusion of the 
Critique if Practical Reason begins with the oft-quoted st~temen~ of 
the two things that "fill the mind with ever new and mcreasmg 
admiration and awe ... : the starry heavens above and the moral 
law within."14 The moral law is apprehended as a sense of duty. 
Duty, in turn, implies an obligation that is necessary (i~ does n~t 
depend on how any individual infact ~~haves) ~nd .umvers~l (~; 
applies to all human beings). It has a categoncallmp~rat1Ve, 
to use Kant's term. That is, maxims or principles of actIOn con-
front me as applications of a moral law. 
Kant concludes that there can be only one possibility for a 
moral law that is necessary and universal and therefore uncondi-
tional. The categorical imperative is: "Act only according to that 
maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law." 15 
From this position we can derive all the great ideas of 
metaphysics: freedom, immortality, and GOd. 16 Freedom is, .for 
Kant the immediate postulate of the moral law. The very notion 
of a ~oral duty is senseless unless I am free to perform it. The 
concepts clearly imply each other. Without freedom there could 
be no moral law. Apart from the moral law I would not know 
that I was free. 
Again, as a reminder, we are not dealing with the realm of 
knowledge. Freedom is a postulate of practical reason, n~t an 
item of knowledge of pure reason. 17 Moreover, freedom IS an 
immediate postulate. My apprehension of duty is senseless with-
out it. 
The second postulate of Kant's ethical religion is immortality. 
This postulate follows, Kant says, from the necessi~y of the m~ral 
law and the principle that what is in fact a duty IS also achIev-
able.1s The moral law demands perfect holiness. This is possible 
only with infinite progress. Thus the soul must be immortal in 
order to achieve this perfection. 
The third postulate is the existence of God. In the first Critique 
Kant had argued that pure reason is incapable of establishing 
any argument for God's existence.19 Thus the existence of God 
cannot be known, but it can be postulated. This is, however, the 
weakest even of the postulates; it is third in line. Practical reason 
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must assume that happiness is coincident with obedience to the 
moral law. Happiness, however, is the con~ition of man in the 
world, that is, the causal world. But a person IS not able to ensure 
such harmony of the noumenal will and the phenomenal.wor~d. 
Thus, if perfection is attainable, then there must be .an mfimte 
God who harmonizes morality and nature and ushers m the final 
state of perfect existence. Christian doctrine refers to this state as 
the kingdom. . 
In this way practical reason gives us no.t ?nly the IIl:am el~­
ments of metaphysics but also leads to relIgIOn: an ethzcal relI-
gion. That is, its only content pertains to ~o:w I ought to act, h?w 
free action is possible, and what the condItIOns are under w.h~ch 
obedience is attainable. Religion, Kant says, is "the recogmtion 
of all duties as divine commands, ... as essential laws of any free 
will as such."20 We turn next, then, to Kant's development of 
religion by practical reason and the position and possibility of 
revelation. 
THE POSSIBILITY AND VALUE OF REVELATION 
In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant works out his 
natural theology. That is, practical reason i~ allowed to fully 
work out its postulates in r~lati?r:- to t?e major the~es of reh-
gious knowledge. The work IS dIVI?ed mto fo~r sectIOns: In. the 
first section Kant explores the subject of man s natural mclma-
tion to evil. In section 2 he discusses the conflict between good 
and evil and the nature of salvation. Section 3 is concerned with 
the nature of true religion and especially the contrast between 
rational and revealed systems. It is this part that occupies most 
of our attention as we discuss directly the possibility of revela-
tion. The final section provides the meaning of service and the 
general mode of life under a rational religion. 
On the Radical Evil in Human Nature 
Is man innately good or evil? Kant's answer to this question is 
two-sided. On the one hand he holds that there is no reason to 
think that any of man's original predispositio~~ are aimed i~ ~ny 
other direction than toward the good. Kant dIVIdes these ongmal 
predispositions into animal (preservation, sex, com~unity), 
human (equality), and personal (respect for law, conSCIOusness 
of law). On the level of these natural instincts man is directed 
toward the moral law. 
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On the other hand Kant considers it obvious that man's will is 
inclined toward evil. In fact, he offers no argument for the posi-
tion; it is self-evident. 
How, then, is this propensity to evil to be explained? What is 
corrupt is not man as man, but the "subjective ground" of his 
will. 21 That is, the maxims or rational principles of choice are no 
longer pure. Man is still conscious of the moral law, however, 
and thus practical reason as such is not destroyed. Evil has 
become, as Kant says, subjectively necessary. It is not innate to 
the species. 
What accounts for the origin of subjective evil? Kant's re-
sponse to this problem is vague at best, and at this point we 
begin to see the difficulties with his rational and nonhistorical, or 
even antihistorical, religion. Since evil's origin is not related to 
the species, it cannot have a single, temporal nature. Kant says 
that historical accounts such as that in Scripture have a moral use 
in helping us understand the nature of a subjective change; but if 
the change is, in fact, related to the will, then its event is not 
phenomenal-that is, having historically identifiable causes-
but rather noumenal. Thus Kant adds in a footnote to this dis-
cussion that the "historical knowledge which has no inner bear-
ing valid for all men belongs to the class of adiaphora, which each 
man is free to hold as he finds edifying." 22 He even tells us that 
as far as our ordinary awareness is concerned, each evil act is to 
be viewed as directly and individually a fall from innocence.23 
If a temporal explanation fails, then what explanation will do? 
Evil must have originated in a rational act of will to incorporate 
improper maxims into-that is, alongside of-the categorical 
moral law, which it continues to know. Kant's difficulty at this 
point is that the rational origin of evil maxims is inscrutable.24 
Evil acts can come only from an evil will, but there is nothing 
that might explain the subjective choice of an evil maxim of will 
on the part of a good individual. How should a good man with a 
good will come to act out of selfishness or cruelty? 
Nevertheless, Kant is convinced of the radical evil of man, 
though man remains accountable because he remains rational 
and free. We are always able to do what we ought to dO. 25 This 
leaves Kant in a second difficulty. Just as the initiation of discor-
dant maxims is inscrutable yet obvious, so also the condition of 
an evil will is irreversible yet restorable. It is irreversible for the 
same reason that its origin is incomprehensible: it is noumenal, 
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not phenomenal, and there is no cause that can explain the 
reversing of the will, understood as practical reason. 
Much of Kant's predicament here results from identifYing the 
will with reason in its practical function, and from placing the 
will in the noumenal realm. There can be neither causes nor 
independent reasons for choices of maxims, except for the moral 
law itself. The universal law is the only maxim that conforms to 
freedom and it is, therefore, a reflection of man's true autono-
mous nature. To obey it is thus the only choice conceivable for 
the rational will. Yet it is just this radical autonomy that makes 
possible the rejection of the freedom to be good. There remains 
no explanation for the adoption of irrational and evil maxims, 
nor for the return to rational functions-except that man is free 
to do so. 
Man himself must make or have made himself into whatever, in a 
moral sense, whether good or evil, he is or is to become. Either 
condition must be an effect of his free choice; for otherwise he 
could not be' held responsible for it and could therefore be morally 
neither good nor evil. 26 
Salvation must also share this noumenal nature. It must be 
possible to return to purity of maxim, but we cannot understand 
how. It must be possible because duty demands it, not because 
revelation tells us. Salvation, Kant says, consists of a simple, yet 
radical change of will, even though the actual change in a man's 
life is gradual. Nevertheless from God's viewpoint (that of time-
less reason), regeneration and sanctification, to use more tradi-
tional theological language, are a simple unity. 
What role does God play in salvation? We again face a dual 
answer. From the point of view of rational freedom any work of 
grace or divine assistance is contradictory in Kant's system. 
For the employment of this idea would presuppose a rule con-
cerning the good which (for a particular end) we ourselves must 
do in order to accomplish something, whereas to await a work of 
grace means exactly the opposite, namely, that the good (the 
morally good) is not our deed but the deed of another being, and 
that we therefore can achzeve it only by doing nothing, which con-
tradicts itself.27 
Theoretically, then, Kant considers grace a useless concept. A 
free will must correct its own principles of choice Nevertheless, 
Kant knows that this is impossible: 
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But does not this restoration through one's Own exertion c\itectly 
contradict the postulate of the innate corruption of man wnicn 
unfits him for all good? Yes, to be sure, as far as the conceiv-
ability, z.e., our znszght into the possibility, of such a restoration is 
concerned.28 
Faced with these difficulties, Kant concludes that while we 
cannot adopt the notion of a work of grace into our maxims of 
reason, we do know that much is beyond our comprehension and 
we can, therefore, choose to accept it by rifiectwe faith. 29 
Concerning the Conflict of the Good With the Evil Principle 
for Sovereignty Over Man 
In the second section of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone 
Kant deals with the actual nature of salvation. The first section 
begins to give, however indirectly, a picture of Kant's view ofthe 
function of revelation. It is clear that individual autonomous 
reason, functioning "practically" in relation to. the moral law, 
must be the ultimate source of knowledge. ThIS now becomes 
much clearer, particularly in Kant's dis~uss~on of the ro.le of 
Christ in salvation. Kant has already dIsmIssed the ratIOnal 
function of a redemptive act of grace, but what about the revela-
tional role of Christ? While Kant deals with other problems as 
well in this section, it is this topic to which he repeatedly returns. 
In the course of section 2 Kant offers at least five reasons why 
revelation-in the form of a model-is unnecessary. The first is 
perhaps the most obvious. There is nothing to be k~own from 
revelation that practical reason cannot postulate by Itself. (We 
must remember that practical reason, strictly speaking, does not 
know.) What is required of man, why it is require?, ~h~t he can 
perform it-all of this is already present to each mdlvldu~l. 
The second reason follows from the first. If man alreaay has 
what he needs then the search for an example or any sort of 
verification is precisely an act of unfaith, not faith. The very act 
of believing in Christ rather than relying on free autonomous 
practical reason is an act of dis.b~lief. 
Third, Kant argues that a hvmg example, known only as a 
phenomenon, could nev~r disclose ~hat is really necessary, 
namely, the purity of maXIms of the w~ll. The latter IS of course a 
noumenal act of reason. Kant states It thus: 
According to the law, each man ought really to furnish an exam-
ple of this idea in his own person; to this end does the archetype 
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reside always in the reason: and this, just because no example in 
outer experience is adequate to it; for outer experience does not 
disclose the inner nature of the disposition but merely allows of an 
inference about it though not one of strict certainty.30 
Fourth, if any man can achieve purity of maxims, then Christ, 
even if it could be proved that his origin was supernatural, can 
be of no benefit to us. There is nothing Christ could reveal to us 
by way of example that is not already understandable by the 
natural man. 
Finally, Kant argues that it is already difficult enough to fol-
low the moral law known to us. It only makes matters worse to 
bring in an outside example. Kant argues in the following way: 
And the presence of this archetype in the human soul is in itself 
sufficiently incomprehensible without our adding to its super-
natural origin the assumption that is hypostasized in a particular 
individual. The elevation of such a holy person above all the 
frailties of human nature would rather, as far as we can·see, hinder 
the adoption of the idea of such a person for our imitation. 31 
Salvation, then, is found in reason, in conformity to the 
archetype known to the mind. 
Now it is our universal duty as men to elevate ourselves to this ideal 
of moral perfection, that is, to this archetype of the moral disposi-
tion in all its purity-and for this the idea itself, which reason 
presents to us for our zealous emulation, can give us power.32 
Kant does have a high regard, however, for the person of 
Christ. At one point he even affirms that we find salvation 
through a ''practical faith in this Son of God. "33 Kant makes one 
suggestion as to how the archetype known to reason can also be 
faith in the Son of God. The mind itself, he says, cannot be the 
source ofthe moral law as a universal and necessary ideal. It can 
only "come down to us from heaven"34 and is thus a "humilia-
tion." 
Kant's ethical religion, then, as shown in the reasons given 
above does not find itself in need of revelation in the sense of a 
historical model. While Kant acknowledges and respects the his-
torical Christ, the statements of Scripture that refer to Christ are 
to be understood existentially, to use a contemporary term. That 
is, the christological statements are to be understood as state-
ments about my self. The revelation of the ideal man in Christ i~, 
in fact, the rational apprehension by man's reason that duty IS 
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identical to the will of God. Scripture'S language is "figura-
tive,"35 or "vivid,"36 or pictoria1.37 For example, Kant says the 
following concerning Scripture's use of "evil spirits" to signify 
the enemies of the archetype: 
This is an expression which seems to have been used not to extend 
our knowledge beyond the world of sense but only to make clear 
jar practical use the conception of what is for us unfathomable.38 
Another example of Kant's use of Scripture can be seen in his 
examination of the concept of sacrifice as necessary for payment 
of debt. Kant can say that it is the archetype that bears the 
penalty for sin. What that means, however, is roughly the fol-
lowing existential translation.39 The sacrifice is the giving up of 
selfish maxims by the rational will. It constitutes ''punishments 
whereby satisfaction is rendered to divine justice."40 In fact, 
each man must do this for himself. 
We turn next to Kant's remarks directly concerning revela-
tion. This involves us in the question of the actual nature of 
religion. 
The Victory of the Good Over the Evil Principle, 
and the Founding of a Kingdom of God on Earth 
In section 3 Kant is concerned to show how a universal reli-
gion is possible. That is, how can all individuals be brought to 
recognize the need to adopt a purity of maxim? The answer is 
simply that revelation cannot achieve this recognition, while ra-
tional faith can-and has done so. We must seek the truth within 
us, not in an external revelation. Kant allows for revelation only 
in a subservient sense. It may show what "has hitherto remained 
hidden from men through their own fault."41 I count in this 
section thirteen reasons why rational faith is superior to revela-
tion. This section, then, applies Kant's epistemology to revela-
tion and clarifies revelation's status in relation to religion. 
1. Rationalfaith is ethical. As we have seen, Kant concludes that 
religion is ethical in nature. Its tenets are postulates of practical 
reason. Thus the purpose of revelation, says Kant, can only be to 
serve practical reason. The principle of biblical exegesis shifts in 
Kant from Luther's explicit christo centrism to ethicocentrism: 
What does the Bible tell me to do?42 Clearly, rational faith is 
superior, since it admits of direct cognizance of the moral law. 
Revelation is indirect at best. 
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2. Rationalfaith is necessary. The religion of practical reason is a 
necessary postulate. It must be true if we are to make sense of our 
knowledge of moral law. Revelational propositions merely are 
true. 
Revelation would have to be verified by reason to be of any 
use. This would have to occur in one of two ways. Eithe~ reaso? 
directly determines the truth of the propositions of revelatlOn o~ It 
verifies the source of that revelation. In the former case revelatlOn 
is of course, uselessly repetitive. It is necessarily true, but only 
b~cause of its verification, line by line, by reason. In the la~ter 
case revelation may provide us with additional informatIOn 
hith~rto undiscovered by reason. However, it cannot be kno,:,",n 
with necessity. Any verification of source, Kant says, must m-
volve historical or factual considerations.43 As a result, our 
knowledge will be a posteriori and contingen~, not nece~sary. 
3. Rationalfaith is universal. The problem WIth revelatlO~ as a 
means of providing man with information on how to act 1~, a<:-
cording to Kant, that it can never reach every.one .. Rev:l~tIOn IS 
empirical in nature and thus bO';lnd.e~ by social, l~ngUlstIc, and 
practical conditions. As a result, mdIVI?Ual revelatIOn. can be the 
source only oflocalized, dogmatizedfazths, not the umversal true 
religion. 
Pure religious faith alone can found a universal church; for only 
[such] rational faith can be believed in and shared by everyone, 
whereas an historical faith, grounded solely on facts, can ~xtend 
its influence no further than tidings of it can reach, subJect. to 
circumstances of time and place and dependent upon the capacIty 
[of men] to judge the credibility of such tidings.44 
4. Ratzonal faith is prior. Any revelation, Kant argues,. is im-
mediately posterior to reason in that it ~ust first be ven?ed or 
authenticated by reason.45 Reason must mterpret revelat.IOn .. 
Kant is forced to deny any notion of a self-authentlcatmg 
knowledge of revelation. There ~s no kno"."~edge without ~~e op-
eration of pure reason. All else ~s supers~l~lOn. In the Cntzque of 
Judgment Kant explains that ratIOnal rehgIOn prevents theology 
from becoming theosophy (the use of transcendental concepts 
above reason) and it prevents religion from becoming theurgy 
(the belief in feeling or ~irect ~o~tact with the supernatural).46 
The general epistemologIcal prmciple cannot be broken, even for 
a supposed divine revelation. 
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5. Rationalfaith is an act of free will. It is thus not only ethically 
prior, but also ontologically prior, to revelation.47 Revelation 
may assist the less thoughtful, but any faith that relies on it 
denies the nature of man. 
Revelation can produce only an ecclesiastical faith. It cannot, 
by itself, give a person true understanding of what is required of 
him. It can tell him, but this is always for Kant an external 
source of knowledge. Thus it indicates a reliance of the will on 
heteronomous sources. This is, of course, a denial of man's au-
tonomous freedom. 
Of all of Kant's reasons, it seems to me that this one strikes at 
the heart of what is important to him. Whereas the others indi-
cate mostly epistemological inferiorities of revelation, this reason 
concerns the very being of man. Rousseau's influence on Kant is 
quite apparent here. But it is also true that Kant's doctrine of 
freedom is firmly grounded in his epistemology. Nothing can be 
known without the operation of pure reason. Nothing can be 
postulated without the uncaused adoption of practical reason. 
6. Rationalfaith is self-promoting. Closely connected to the above 
is revelation's dependence on a "learned public" that is related 
to the origin of the revelation by a tradition ofscholarship.48 In a 
sense, revelational faith is thus elitist. It cannot continue without 
highly skilled exegetes and theologians who verify and interpret 
the revelation to the common man. Rational faith needs no such 
assistance. It promotes itself. Every person is capable of full 
comprehension of the dictates of practical reason. 
7. Rational faith is an end. Ecclesiastical or revelational faith, 
because it is not fully rational, can only be a means to an end and 
not an end in itself.49 It serves as a vehicle for rational faith but it 
can never function as a goal. Rational faith embodies the fulfill-
ment of human existence. Man's ultimate goal is found in free 
moral conformity to the categorical imperative. 
8. Rational faith is complete. A truly saving faith must accom-
plish two purposes, Kant holds.50 It must first provide "atone-
ment"; that is, it must undo sin and return a person to purity of 
maxim. Second, it must provide morality. It must give a person a 
new life and tell him how to live. 
The atonement of revelation is incomplete. It does not tell a 
person how to live a new life but tells him simply that he is 
forgiven without first improving his life. No thoughtful person 
can bring himself to believe this. The best proof of this, says 
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Kant, is that ifit were true then surely people would universally 
respond. This is clearly not the case, but Kant is certain that 
universal response would be so for the ethical religion of reason. 
9. Rational faith is productive. Revelational faith, and Kant in-
cludes Christian revelation here, is not universally effective in 
changing men's lives. 51 Some will choose to obey it-and even 
that is, of course, a decision for heteronomy-but many will not 
alter their conduct. Rational faith, however, never fails. Recogni-
tion of the moral law always converts the free will that sees there 
the fulfillment of its being. 
10. Rational faith is private. Revelation produces actual, local 
ecclesiastical faiths. These are external and public congre-
gations. Rational faith, at least until the goal of universality is 
achieved, "has no public status."52 It is purely an inner change, 
an invisibly developing church. 
11. Rational faith is ultzmate. Kant's theology is specifically 
goal-oriented. The title of one of his shorter works is translated 
Perpetual Peace (1795). The German title is Zum ewigen Frieden, 
that is literally, To Eternal Peace. Kant outlines here how his 
ethical religion works itself out in political policies. He is con-
vinced in the Religzon that the religion of reason will lead to 
universal peace and harmony. Revelational faiths may accom-
plish limited peace. The ultimate stage of human history, how-
ever, will not be ushered in until rational faith has become uni-
versa1.53 Ultimacy is thus tied to universality. 
12. Rationalfaith is permanent. Since rational faith will usher in 
the ultimate end of history, and since a will with pure maxims 
cannot corrupt itself, the results of such faith are permanent. 
Reason's victory is eterna1.54 
13. Rational faith is identical with revelational faith. After all that 
has been said, this final point may seem contradictory. Kant's 
point, however, is important to the question of merrant revela-
tion. Kant seems always to assume that despite all of the in-
feriorities of revelation, ifit could, in fact, be shown to be authen-
tically divine in origin-by prior reason-that would constitute 
proof of its truthfulness. 
We have already seen, however, that Kant interprets the na-
ture of truthfulness in a moral or existential rather than a de-
scriptive and historical sense. Thus a literal sense of inerrancy 
cannot apply in Kant's view of revelation. Genuine revelation 
must be identical in content to purely rational faith. In both the 
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content is the archetype of human conduct, "lying in our reason, 
that we attribute to [Christ] (since, so far as his example can be 
known, he is found to conform thereto)."55 
When we, then, properly understand a verified revelation, its 
content will coincide with the product of reason alone. This is the 
proper function of religion. Kant says, "It concerns us not so 
much to know what God is in Himself (His nature) as what He is 
for us as moral beings (emphasis added)."56 
Concerning Service and Pseudo-Service Under the Sovereignty 
of the Good Principle 
While Kant's stated subject in this section deals with the 
organizational aspects of religion, the section serves also as a 
summary statement on the relationship between reason and 
revelation. I am commenting on it here for just that purpose. 
Kant's position on revelation begins, of course, with his epis-
temology, which requires that religion in general be ethical in 
content. Religion is simply the understanding of the moral im-
perative, no longer abstractly, but as God's will. As Kant 
phrases it, religion is "the recognition of all duties as divine 
commands." 57 
Since religion is concerned only with individual behavior (it is in 
that sense existential), it is not the imparting of true propositions 
either of fact or metaphysics. 
As regards the theoretical apprehension and avowal of belief, no 
assertorial knowledge is required (even of God's existence), since, 
with our lack of insight into supersensible objects such avowal 
might well be dissembled; rather it is merely a problematical as-
sumption (hypothesis) regarding the highest cause of things that 
is presupposed speculatively .... The minimum of knowledge (it is 
possible that there may be a God) must suffice, subjectively, for 
whatever can be made the duty of every man.58 
Religion, however, is not simply a list of particular duties and 
services. It would then offend man's autonomy. Religion is sim-
ply the recognition that duty, apprehended in the moral law, is 
related to God as postulated by practical reason. 
Religion, so defined, must rest on universal human reason. 
Any revelation will lead to an individual and local church be-
cause of its empirical character. It cannot command uncondi-
tional allegiance because its authenticity and authority must first 
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be determined by reason. Kant says this of revelation's claim to 
authority: 
Since assu~anc~ on this s~ore rests on no grounds of proof other 
than the hIstorIcal, and smce there ever will remain in the judg-
ment of the people ... the absolute possibility of an error which 
has ~rept in thr~ugh their interpretation or through previous 
classIcal exegesIs, the cle;gyman would De requiring the 
people ... to confess somethmg to be as true as is their belief in 
God .... 59 
?ur belief in God rests on a postulate of practical reason. Belief 
m the truth of revelation could never be more than possible and 
cor;tt~ngen~. Thus Kant warns us of the problem when we "seek 
rehgIOn wIthout and not within US."60 
EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE 
Ther~ can be little doubt. that .Kant's epistemology figures 
largely m t?e cor:temporary dISc~ssion concerning the possibility 
and actual~t! of merrant revelatIOn. Many of the characteristics 
of the pOSitIOns of those who deny authoritative and inerrant 
re~elation are drawn directly from Kant. In many cases the 
rehance on Kant is explicit and admitted. And, while it is true 
th~t some ele~ents of this position are prior to Kant, it seems 
eVIdent that It was Kant who first put them into a coherent 
whole and introduced them into the mainstream of Christian 
(particularly German) theology. From Kant the line of influence 
is not difficult to trace through Schleiermacher to nineteenth-
century liberalism, and then to contemporary neoliberalism. 
S~h~bert Ogden, p:rhaps the most prominent interpreter and 
cntic of Bultmann m the late 1950s, is the spokesman of those 
wh~ are currently working out a "process" theology, following 
WhItehead and Hartshorne, on top of an existential epistemol-
ogy.61 I will use Ogden as a source throughout the Evaluation 
and Critique. 
The Value of a Revelation 
. "':e will examine two aspects of Kant's philosophy that show 
hIS mfluence: first, the bifurcation in Kant's epistemology be-
tween facts and values and the effect of that bifurcation on ar-
guments for the existence of God and on the value of an inerrant 
revelation; second, the view of salvation and human nature and 
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Kant's emphasis on choice-the free act of the will-and the 
implications of that view for the necessity of revelation. 
The bifurcation between facts and values shows itself in Kant 
as the two functions of pure and practical reason. While contem-
porary theologians may use different terminology, the result is 
the same: the source of science is different from the source of 
values. There is a difference not only in source, and thus in the 
mode of verification, but also in status. Facts are known; values 
are not, even though they are considered important. This bifur-
cation is clearly seen in the many variations of existential 
theological epistemologies as the distinction between "objective" 
knowledge known by the senses and "existential" awareness. 
(The latter is the direct, intuitive confrontation with the inner 
self and its possibility of authentic existence.) 
The existence of God is included in the list of what ought to be, 
not of what, in fact, is. This goes hand in hand with the summary 
rejection of the arguments for God's existence. In existential 
theology this becomes the denial of God as "an object among 
objects." Ogden's only argument, if that is the correct term, for 
God's reality is a strictly moral one, similar to Kant's. God must 
exist, says Ogden, or else our trust in the value and meaning of 
life makes no sense.62 There is no argument based on the objec-
tive data but only on the demands of existentialist awareness. 
Kant's position and influence are curiously two-sided at this 
point. There is, on the one hand, no denying the fact that Kant 
believed there is a God and that Kant was pious and religious, at 
least in an ethical sense. Kant is clearly not intentionally a 
naturalist. On the other hand, Kant's position leads to a rejec-
tion of supernaturalism as a rational option. God's existence can-
not be known, only postulated. Following Kant there have been, 
not surprisingly, a series of non cognitive, subjective or practical 
attempts to justify belief. Feeling, experience, encounter, pre-
cognitive choices of categories or language games, and many 
other options have been suggested. They all agree on one thing: 
they concede with Kant's agnosticism that a truly rational ap-
proach is impossible. The specific objections that Kant raised to 
the theistic arguments have long been countered from many 
quarters. Nevertheless, the opinion that the arguments are unre-
liable and that religion is nonrational has continued as the 
majority view, frequently even among conservative theologians 
and evangelicals in philosophy. 
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This influence of Kant seems to me to be one of the primary 
factors that have led many contemporary theologians to deny the 
real value of an inerrant revelation. If the truly important mat-
ters oflife, such as God and the possibility of authentic existence, 
are not to be known by ordinary knowledge, then they will not be 
known by propositional communication, particularly not that of 
historical events. The language of facts is well suited for science 
and ordinary activities, but it will not do for the inner and the 
subjective. Thus any revelation in objective language, the Bible 
in particular, must be, to use the contemporary term, "de-
mythologized" and interpreted existentially. Kant did not use 
this vocabulary, but his position is substantially the same: the 
pictorial language of Scripture must be translated into moral 
language. 
This Kantian view of revelation is one of the main ingredients 
in what was to become the German "higher criticism" move-
ment. There had already been many Enlightenment thinkers 
who had dismissed the miraculous elements of Scripture 
wholesale. Johann Semler (1725-1791) appears to have been the 
first to advocate the individual consideration, from a critical 
literary and historical standpoint, of the separate books of the 
Bible. Kant's contribution to this movement, as we have seen, is 
the criterion for translating Scripture into a useful contemporary 
reading and seeking for its moral function. In this operation 
practical reason remains, of course, the authority. 
Kant's influence has clearly extended also to the view of sal-
vation. Since revelation is, at best, an aid to slow and less-
developed minds, salvation becomes the dual process of recog-
nition and self-change. For Kant, this recognition is of one's 
failure to live in true freedom (autonomy) as God intends. 
For Ogden, and like-minded theologians, this recognition is that 
we are not maximizing the potential for authentic existence 
exemplified in Christ. Increasingly, this authenticity is inter-
preted as freedom. Such has always been true of existential 
theologians, Bultmann in particular, but in Ogden such an in-
terpretation is now more explicit because of the influence of 
liberation theology. 63 
Self-change is the other aspect of the process of salvation. This 
is the deliberate, free, and understanding act of the will. In Kant 
it is the choice toward purity of maxims. This is simply to say 
that the possibility of freedom is open when it is recognized. I 
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can change my behavior toward freedom if only I know I can. 
The identical transition can be found in contemporary followers 
of Kant. There is no need for redemptive atonement, certainly 
not for propitiation. There is no just and holy God. Freedom, 
and thus authenticity, is there for the choosing. 
Furthermore, this salvation is not only possible but, in some 
sense, partially present. For Kant, the recognition may need 
some prodding from revelation. For Ogden, too, it is helpful to 
have a historical example. But in neither view can revelation be 
necessary. It is a rational postulate that all men must make in 
order to make sense of their moral experience. Ogden refers to 
this recognition as "original revelation" given to all men. Noth-
ing additional could or need be said.64 For Kant, of course, 
anything more would be illusory. 
The convergence of the characteristics of Kant's position and 
of those who deny authoritative, inerrant revelation, results from 
a root identity, namely, in epistemology. I shall simply trace the 
logic of Kant's position, reversing in the following section the 
order of the logic of the system and moving toward its starting 
point. 
Kant and Inerrancy 
The conclusion of Kant's system is a curious mixture. Kant 
never denies the possibility of revelation, yet his epistemology 
precludes its authoritative nature. If the revelation comes in the 
form of visual or audible data, then it is known only by rational 
judgment. If it is some form of direct intuition or dictation, then 
it cannot be known-unless judged to be true by an independent 
reason. In either case, the possibility of an inerrant revelation 
appears to be precluded. There can be no inspired source that is 
epistemologically authoritative for man. Revelation can be 
meaningful only as a sample of moral behavior. 
A parallel conclusion is the lack of necessity that pertains to 
the atonement of Christ. For Kant Christ is an example. For 
Ogden he is an objectification of human potential. In neither 
case is there any redemptive value, and even the revelational 
value is contingent. 
All of the conclusions regarding the function of revelation fol-
low from the Kantian principle that a person can do what he 
ought to do. In other words, man, despite the radical evil in him, 
is still capable of pure ethical action. While Kant's (and Og-
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den's) epistemology explains the nonnecessity o~t.he atonement, 
it is this position of the inherent goodness and abIlIty of man that 
really implies it. .. , 
Again, however, we must ask for the final ~asis ~n Kant s 
system from which his view of revelation and hIS ethICS result. 
The answer I think, is found in his doctrine of the autonomy of 
reason. The' first sentence of the preface to the first edition of the 
Religion is this: 
So far as morality is based upon the conception of man as a free 
agent who, just because he is free, binds himse~f through ~is rea-
son to unconditioned laws, it stands in need neIther of the Idea of 
another Being over him, for him to apprehend his duty, nor of an 
incentive other than the law itself, for him to do his duty.65 
Thus, while religious man recognizes the connection between 
duty and the will of God, reason itself, whereby he makes that 
judgment and determines his action, is wholly free. E~en knowl-
edge of the sensible universe depends on the operatIOn of that 
reason. The autonomy of reason is, then, related to the split 
between reality and appearance, between the noumenal world 
itself and the phenomenal world that I know. . 
It is not surprising then that contemporary theo~oglan~ cannot 
accept an authoritative, inerrant Scripture. Kantlan eplsten:ol-
ogy still reigns. Ogden, for example, goes so far as to say thIS: 
Kant's philosophy has come to have unofficially something like 
the same status among Protestants as Thomas' has long had 
among Roman Catholics-and this for the .very good reas~m that 
Kant's distinction between man's theoretIcal and practIcal ra-
tionality made possible a salvage operation typical of m?dern 
Protestantism and comparable in significance to that prevlOusly 
carried out by Thomas in distinguishing between reason and 
faith.66 
It is clear, then, that any theology that accepts inerrancy and 
authority must construct an alternative epistemology. to K~~t's. 
To do so will involve destroying two key tenets of hIS pOSItIOn. 
The first is the atomic, sensationist theory of empirical data; that 
is that there are isolated and purely physical impulses detected 
b~ the body without order or meaning apart from th: function of 
reason and thus that reason and the senses are entIrely separa-
ble in ~peration. The second,and clos~ly ,~elated, tenet. is Kant's 
principle (the "transcendental deductlOn ) that what IS pres up-
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posed by. our understanding. of the data cannot be part of, or 
mcluded m, the data. Thus tIme, space, oneness, causality, and 
so on, are part of the mind's functioning, not of the data. 
Tr~ditionally~ attempts to refute the Kantian epistemology 
have mvol:ved eIther some version of realism (that is, that we in 
some speCIfied sense know the real world), or idealism (that is, 
that knowledge is of ideas whose source, in some versions of 
idealism, is God). Kant himself attempted to refute idealism in 
his first Critique by demonstrating the "emptiness" of rational 
concepts apart from externally derived content. His arguments 
are, I think, successful. If they are valid, then it may well be that 
a commitment to the inerrant authority of Scripture rests on a 
defen~e and ~ontinued refinement of a realist epistemology. 
ThIS essay IS not the place to attempt any positive construction 
of an epistemology. It must suffice to point out that neither of 
Kant's. tenets is necessary. The first, that of atomic impressions, 
he denved from Hume. It is the cornerstone of the Enlighten-
ment model of perception, shared both by rationalists such as 
Descartes and Leibniz and by empiricists such as Locke and 
Be:keley. While t?es~ p~ilosophers, as well as many subsequent 
phIlosophers contmumg mto the present, disagree as to the value 
of impressions, they all agree that those impressions are atomic. 
~hat is, in their primitive state as apprehended, they are indi-
VIdual sounds, colors, tactile impressions, and so on. 
It is not, however, either obvious or clear that we see hear 
. . ' , 
and feel ImpreSSIOns rather than reality67 or individual data 
rather than a total environment.68 Choosing the model of atomic 
data leaves the extremely difficult problem of explaining how 
and with what authority the mind coordinates these bits and 
pieces and interprets the results. There is an alternate model, 
that is, that we apprehend directly a segment of the real world. 
This model leaves some serious problems as well, but they are 
not insurmountable. The typical arguments for the atomic model 
can be countered.69 We can thus avoid the skepticism about the 
noumenal world that plagues Humean and Kantian epis-
temologies. 
Kant's second epistemological tenet is similarly susceptible to 
criticism. A. N. Whitehead has argued that Kant's attempt to 
base objectivity on subjectivity is "thoroughly topsy-turvy."70 
One does not have to agree with Whitehead's own position to see 
the cogency of his rejection of Kant's. Because Kant's model of 
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awareness is that of the passive reception of impressions , he must 
conclude that anything beyond the simple "thereness" of im-
pressions is an active contribution of mind. This necessity falls, 
however, if we reject Kant's model of atomic impressions and 
allow for a fully personal interaction with a total environment. 
But, again, I am not concerned to demonstrate an alternative, 
only to show that Kant's whole position depends on his epis-
temology, which itself depends on some debatable assump-
tions.71 
The task of constructing an epistemology is extremely crucial. 
The availability of supernaturalism as a fully rational option, 
and an inerrant revelation as even viable, let alone factual, hangs 
in the balance. If Ogden is correct in his assessment of Kant's 
present influence, and I think he is, it is not surprising that the 
doctrine of a supernaturally given Scripture, authoritative and 
inerrant, is held by most of our contemporaries to be not only 
false, but incomprehensible. 
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